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ABSTRACT 
A systems engineering process model for the acquisition of large, 
complex systems for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is 
being adapted for ongoing experiments in acquisition process 
policies. The discrete‐event simulation model of the larger 
“enterprise of acquisition” for weapon systems has a broad scope 
from program beginning through development.  It reveals some of 
the challenges and risks in weapon system acquisition.   
Initially the model was used to evaluate potential policies as 
interventions and/or system changes in an Air Force context.  The 
simulation results showed varying degrees of influence on 
program outcomes and suggested no single antidote exists for 
solving acquisition problems.  Many of the negative outcomes 
reflected through cost and schedule overruns are due to the 
behavior of the acquisition system itself. 
A collaboration between the Air Force Institute of Technology 
(AFIT), the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), and The Aerospace 
Corporation is underway to translate the model and adapt it for 
new considerations.   Shortly we will propagate new model 
versions and results to the public, and use it for additional Air 
Force and Navy programs of concern. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.2.9 [Software Engineering]: Management– Life cycle, Time 
estimation.  
General Terms 
Management, Measurement, Experimentation, Standardization. 
Keywords 
Acquisition, Weapon System, Department of Defense, Modeling 
and Simulation 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This research is for the assessment and improvement of a systems 
acquisition process performed at the defense enterprise level. We 
are using modeling and simulation to gain system understanding 
and evaluate improvement options.  The system-of-interest is the 
socio-technical acquisition system covering activities of many 
contractors and agencies.  Subsumed within these organizations 
are the detailed, traditional systems and software engineering 
processes conducted for respective system portions.   
The Wirthlin Acquisition model [1] being used is a process model 
for systems engineering performed in the very large.  It takes the 
highest-level view of managing all development processes within 
the acquisition system supply chain enterprise. It models systems 
engineering activities in the socio-technical acquisition lifecycle 
as-is, and we are extending it to look at process alternatives. 
Through this modeling approach, insights into the measurement 
and evaluation of large enterprises are possible.  For instance, if 
DoD Acquisition is in constant state of “reform” or 
“transformation,” how should it be measured?  How could 
changes be evaluated?  How should system behaviors be 
represented?  The model provides new ways to analyze the large, 
complex enterprise.  
The process outputs of cost, schedule, and performance are 
usually used to measure overall system outcomes.  Modeling and 
simulation can answer such questions as “How long did a program 
take to get through the system?” and “What is the likelihood any 
system will complete development and be ready for large-scale 
production?”  
The next sections overview the acquisition process, how the 
model was produced, what was learned from it, and how others 
can apply it, including our current and future work. 
2. BACKGROUND 
On many programs local systems and software processes are to be 
integrated within a larger enterprise process.  System acquisition 
processes undertaken by large governmental agencies exemplify 
such extremely large, encompassing, complex enterprise 
processes.  The U.S. defense enterprise acquisition system is a 
classic example of the interplay among elements in a very 
complex socio-technical system. 
Such a system often confounds efforts to contain cost and 
schedule growth.  For example, U.S. DoD programs averaged 
about 40% schedule growth and approximately 50% cost growth 
[2].  From an enterprise perspective, since the 1970s, total budget 
overruns for DoD system development of at least 30% have been 
the norm and are increasing [3].   
Since development programs may require decades to transit the 
existing process from beginning to end, and the process is 
constantly being changed and adapted, without a model there is 
great difficulty conducting longitudinal analyses that reflect the 
actual state of the system at any given time. 
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2.1 The Acquisition System  
Between policy choices and statutory requirements, the DoD has 
developed a number of processes and organizations for systems 
acquisition.  The structure and appearance of the organizations 
responsible to acquire new systems have only grown more 
complicated through the years.   
Within the DoD, there are three key processes that interact with 
one another in weapon systems development.  Together, these are 
coined as the Big “A” of Acquisition.  The first of these processes 
is the manner by which the end-user or the war fighter determines 
requirements that need to be fulfilled as a product of the 
acquisition system called the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) [4].  The other major systems are 
the Programming, Planning, and Budget Execution (PPBE) 
process and the Acquisition process.  A miniaturized version of 
the Defense Acquisition System “Wall Chart”  (December 2008 
version) in Figure 1 illustrates the overall process.  There are three 
primary milestones shown for Milestones A, B and C in the 
acquisition lifecycle (MS A, MS B, MS C). 
Furthermore, the acquisition system categorizes programs using a 
series of Acquisition categories (ACAT).  ACAT I programs are 
typically the largest or the most politically sensitive.  ACAT II 
programs typically are software intensive and have special 
requirements.  ACAT III programs don’t qualify in either of the 
other ACAT categories and are usually much less money and less 
politically sensitive.  These are all known as “Programs of 
Record.”  There are a handful of ACAT I programs, a few more 
ACAT II programs and many more ACAT III programs in 
existence at any given time.  Additionally, programs that don’t 
meet any of the criteria defining ACATs exist which are 
monetarily miniscule in comparison to other programs. 
 
 
Figure 1: Defense acquisition system “wall chart” 
 
2.2 Previous Simulation Work 
The few previous simulation models that explored acquisition 
level processes are overviewed in [5].  Most of them were 
continuous systems models with smaller focuses or sub-domains, 
and not at the full DoD enterprise level. 
An integrated acquisition, systems and software process model 
would involve modeling overall system feasibility as well as 
process development considerations (e.g. cost, schedule, quality).   
The SAMSA virtual acquisition process in [6] incorporated 
system dynamics for project modeling. The dynamics of the 
relationship between prime contractor and government program 
office during research and development for aircraft acquisition 
was investigated in [7].  In the automobile domain, a system 
dynamics model framework for a software supplier acquisition 
process was described in [8].   
The acquisition process for a large-scale government system at 
The Aerospace Corporation was the focus in [9] to better 
understand the software-intensive system acquisition process. A 
case-study approach was used to explore the dynamics of 
"disconnects" in baselines across multiple organizations in a large 
software-intensive space system development program.  
The system dynamics model was of communication effectiveness 
and delay across four organizations that sequentially and 
iteratively relied on each other for requirements and deliverables.  
It suggested the highest points of leverage in reducing disconnects 
are increasing expertise levels, improving communication clarity, 
and accelerating change impact assessment across organizations.  
These results may oppose traditional assumptions that disconnects 
are due to external requirements changes and that speeding up 
organizational processes will reduce disconnects. 
 
3. MODEL OVERVIEW 
The model has a larger lifecycle scope than the previous studies 
that stretches from Pre-MS A activities to MS C.  It includes five 
communities: User, Requirements function (e.g. JCIDS), the 
PPBE system, Acquisition system, and Prime Contractors.  It is 
the first to model the big “A” of Acquisition at a high level of 
abstraction.  
It combines the “official” process flow with observed realities and 
validated observations of the probabilities and time required with 
the different steps. It uses value stream mapping techniques to 
form the basis of the model. 
The model's primary entity represents a program with attributes 
that include ACAT level. The entity flows through the acquisition 
process and may exit the process without successful completion at 
any of 22 points, or may successfully complete the process at MS 
C. The model, programmed in Rockwell Automation's Arena 
simulation software [10], is run many times (usually thousands or 
tens of thousands) to obtain probability of successful completion 
and a distribution of total time through the process. 
The model scope within the overall acquisition system is in Figure 
2, showing it organized around swim lanes.  Each lane consists of 
a functional process and organizational arrangement.  The 
horizontal axis serves as a loose representation of time.  The first 
User swim lane is the source of many different ideas, concepts, 
and formal direction given to various system development 
questions.  
 
Figure 2: Model scope within overall acquisition system 
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The model's flow diagram in Figure 3 has characteristics of the 
“wall chart” in Figure 1. It shows the big “A” of Acquisition 
consists of three large interacting processes divided along 
functional lines, and along a temporal scale.  The system is huge 
in scale and scope, but the primary focus is the acquisition of 
weapon systems, so the sustainment phase is excluded.  The 
production phase (post MS-C) was excluded because most costs 
for the design and development have already been incurred.   
 
Figure 3: Defense acquisition simulation model 
 
Figure 4 shows histograms for each ACAT level of formal process 
outcomes with no excursions (process shortcuts). The histograms 
in Figure 5 compare durations for two types of acquisition 
programs: full processes vs. optional process shortcuts. 
 




Figure 5: Comparison of MS C arrivals between full 
process and shortcut processes 
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3.1 Process Elicitation 
Initially written materials were used as sources about the 
acquisition system including official documentation, books, and 
journal articles.  Later this was expanded to include the 
requirements and funding portions of the system. 
Two studies were then undertaken to better understand the 
acquisition system.  The first focused on acquisition professionals, 
and the second built upon the initial findings and interviewed 
personnel in the other two systems.  From these a model was 
developed that captured the findings and frame the problem. 
During the second study, each interviewee was asked about 
different outcome measures of their task:  How long did it take to 
do their job? They abstracted answers into a time range or a time 
distribution. These probabilities on decisions and key process 
checkpoints were used to fill in the gaps from the official source 
document idealized process flows. 
Typical uncertainties on the time duration of a given task in days 
allowed the use of triangular or binomial distributions.  The time 
elapsed for a program is then simply the cumulative value of the 
number of days required to go through the overall system. 
3.2 Empirical Data 
Empirical data sources used include DAMIR (Defense 
Acquisition Management Information Retrieval) data access,  
SMART (System Metric and Reporting Tool) data, MAR scores 
(all programs of record; some since 1990s), PoPS scores (all 
programs of record since 2006), SAR data, APBs, Air Force 
Financial data and library access, PEM assignments; PE to 
program mapping; P & R documents, PEO system groupings; 
ACAT levels for programs; OSD Acquisition Management data 
access, all PMDs since 1989, SACOM data access, Acquisition 
manning data and expert interviews.  The full acronyms and 
details for all these sources are in [1]. 
4. MODEL USAGE AND RESULTS 
The goal of the simulation studies was to gain system 
understanding and evaluate improvement options.  Some key 
questions relating to these are: “How does the model respond to 
interventions patterned after some of the proposed changes to the 
overall system?”  “Will there be any improvement in the total 
time required for a program to arrive at MS C?”  “Will there be 
any improvement in overall process quality?” 
Experimental interventions were then undertaken to answer these 
questions.  Twenty different interventions were evaluated.  One 
example is described next. 
Air Staff Intervention: This intervention explores what will 
happen with the model outcomes if the process step “Air 
Staff” is minimized.  This will see how the model reacts if a 
component is eliminated from the system or what would 
happen if a step on the “critical path” of this swim lane is 
removed.  The “Air Staff” process step refers to the process 
where the Air Staff coordinates the review of a given JCIDS 
document between the other services and also different 
MAJCOMs.     
Simulation results indicated this intervention did not substantively 
reduce or change the outcomes.  While initially surprising, the 
location, purpose and duration of this process in the overall 
enterprise effort was a very small piece compared to the totality of 
the acquisition process.  
Many interesting patterns emerged from the experiments with 
selected interventions [1], [11].  One example result shows the 
greatest impacts on the mean outcome by intervention type, in 
order of impact compared to baseline 1.0 (value / percent 
reduction): 
- All interventions  (0.81 / 19%) 
- Eight random interventions  (0.83 / 17%) 
- SE and Acquisition termination  (0.84 / 16%) 
- “Top three”  (0.85 / 15%) 
- Acquisition termination  (0.91 / 9%) 
- SE / funding stability and technical uncertainty (0.93 / 7%) 
- Funding stability  (0.96 / 4%) 
- Technical uncertainty  (0.97 / 3%). 
Data was collected at various points with an experimental sample 
of 48500 simulated programs.  The results show the vast majority 
of programs never make it into the formal system.  Between being 
rejected outright or rejected after a small “socialization” period, 
62% of all attempts end in this manner. Further analysis shows 
half of the remaining programs get diverted into existing 
acquisition programs where they will be accomplished as part of 
another system’s sustainment process.   
Finally, nearly ¾ of all programs that formally enter the 
Acquisition system comprised of JCIDS, PPBE, and acquisition, 
arrive at MS C.  The model suggests that while the initial entry 
barrier is high, once into the system, the likelihood of eventually 
reaching MS C is very high. 
Once a system “enters” the formal acquisition system, it has a 
better than even chance of making it to MS C.  A program’s best 
chance for success is to enter somewhere other than the 
“beginning” of the formal system.  Chances increase from about a 
60% success rate for a program entering at the beginning to more 
than 85% for programs entering the formal system elsewhere 
along the line.  These results are in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Experimental model outcomes (48500 samples) 
4.1 Verification and Validation 
Data was tabulated from open-source, Air Force, and Government 
information regarding program performance in terms of cost and 
schedule of multiple programs at various ACAT Levels. This was 
a separate, independent look at data sources to validate the 
model’s outcomes rather than rely upon GAO reports. Statistical 
testing used 164 programs of record.  
For the model we used 10000 data samples for completing 
Milestone C with no deviations from the “normal” process, e.g. 
MS A to MS B to MS C, etc., against actual program data. 
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The null hypothesis H0 is that the mean difference between the 
samples is zero. Since the t-statistic < t critical (1.20 < 2.09) and p 
value > alpha (0.24 > 0.05), the null hypothesis is not rejected at 
the 95% confidence level. 
Similar results restricted to specific program attributes, e.g. 
ACAT I model samples vs. ACAT I actual program results, 
yielded similar results.  The null hypothesis was not rejected at the 
95% confidence level for any of these more specific comparisons. 
Across all breakdowns of data, there is a high degree of 
confidence that the mean difference between the data is zero.  
This analysis was also done excluding those programs that had not 
yet reached MS C. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the means 
of the two samples (model results vs. actual program data) are the 
same between MS B and MS C at a 95% confidence level [1]. 
5. CURRENT AND FUTURE WORK 
We are studying alternative acquisition processes, the DoD 
5000.02 policy for the defense acquisition system [12], analyzing 
empirical program data, and providing support tools for 
acquisition planning. Initially this research used the US Air Force 
processes as representative to illustrate the system capabilities and 
challenges.  It is more general and can be used for all the services. 
In the current team collaboration we are using simulation 
environments and tools at NPS to support the model translation 
from Arena to ExtendSim [13]. These tools are helping in our 
understanding of the current model. We are also prototyping web-
based versions for open public access. 
At The Aerospace Corporation, the algorithms are being 
replicated in an ExtendSim model.  This translation will be our 
basis for further experiments and extensions. 
Example planned extensions include a model predictive option, 
domain tailorability, adding risk and cost measures, explicit 
modeling of the PPBE process, and evaluating other DoD process 
options like the Incremental Commitment Model [14] (e.g. it 
provides risk-driven guidance for killing projects). 
We have completed the model translation, other acquisition 
stakeholders are seeing value in the model and are putting more 
resources into the translation effort.  
We can describe our future study plans with an historical analogy 
in software process modeling.  The Abdel-Hamid project model 
[15] spawned multiple lines of investigation for software 
development, from deeper looks at the process, considering other 
outcomes such as quality, and specialized models.  We envision 
that the Wirthlin model can do the same for DoD acquisition 
modeling. 
Our intent is that the acquisition model translations and extensions 
will be available to collaborators and the public. The current 
translation with ExtendSim will be the basis, the initial results are 
imminent and can be reported shortly.   
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